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CONSTRUCTION LAW
Christopher G. Hill *
This article will review recent case law and legislative enact-
ments in Virginia of significance to Virginia's contractors, subcon-
tractors, material suppliers and design professionals. The article
will also discuss the growing sustainable or "green" building
trend in Virginia and elsewhere and the potential issues that this
relatively new phenomenon will raise.
I. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
The 2010 bill that will likely have the most impact on the con-
struction industry is the amendment to Virginia Code section
54.1-411. The amendment to the Virginia Code removes language
precluding the use of limitation of liability clauses by design pro-
fessionals., In its place, the General Assembly substituted lan-
guage stating that the change does not relieve individuals practic-
ing in the covered professions from any liability arising from his
or her employment with a covered entity.2
The change, while a seemingly subtle one, reinstates the long-
standing Virginia maxim that the contract is king by explicitly al-
lowing architects, professional engineers, land surveyors, certified
interior designers, and landscape architects to limit their liability
by contract for certain damages arising from their acts.3 Fur-
thermore, it will allow these construction professionals the free-
dom of contract to assure both themselves and their insurance
* LEED AP, Construction Attorney, The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC,
Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1997, Washington University School of Law; A.B., 1994, Duke
University.
1. Act of Mar. 9, 2010, ch. 99, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-411 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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carriers that they are held harmless in the event of design or en-
gineering defects.
In an unsurprising development, the Virginia General Assem-
bly could not keep their hands off of the mechanics' lien statute.
The latest change involves the use of a mechanics' lien agent on
residential projects.5 Starting on July 1, 2010, a contractor can no
longer depend on the failure of the owner to list a mechanics' lien
agent on the posted building permit.' The new statute requires
that a contractor go beyond merely reading the building permit
and make a reasonable inquiry with the local building authority
to determine the identity of the mechanics' lien agent.7
Another key change to this provision allows an owner to amend
a building permit to add a mechanics' lien agent at a date some-
time after the beginning of construction.8 Based on this new
change to the statute, contractors must be constantly vigilant to
file their required notices to the agent because the owner may
claim that the contractor or subcontractor failed to notify the me-
chanics' lien agent named on the permit (regardless of if the work
to be performed by the contractor or subcontractor is complete).9
These two statutory changes will have a great impact on the
practice of law as it relates to construction projects.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Mechanics' Liens
In the past two years, the courts have decided several interest-
ing cases relating to the Virginia mechanics' lien statutes."o Each
of these decisions highlights the fact that the Virginia courts will
strictly construe the language of the mechanics' lien statutes and
4. See id. Architects and other design professionals would be wise to re-examine
their standard contractual language in light of this change in the statute.
5. Act of Apr. 10, 2010, ch. 341, 2010 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 43-1, -4.01 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
6. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4.01(C) (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
7. Id.
8. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
9. Id. Contractors would be well served to check with local building authorities on a
regular basis throughout construction.
10. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1 to -23.2 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
228 [Vol. 45:227
CONSTRUCTION LAW
require those that attempt to avail themselves of this powerful
remedy to follow the letter of the statutes with total precision.',
In Dallan Construction, Inc. v. Super Structures General Con-
tractors, Inc. ("Super Structures"), the Hanover County Circuit
Court considered the question of what a general contractor could
include in its lien." In Super Structures, the general contractor,
Super Structures, a constructor of prefabricated buildings, or-
dered materials and partially constructed buildings for Dallan
Construction, Inc. (the plaintiff).13 However, Super Structures did
not deliver the materials to the project, nor did it install the
buildings on the site.14
Dallan Construction then cancelled the contract, and, predicta-
bly, Super Structures recorded a memorandum of mechanics'
lien.15 Dallan Construction filed suit to declare the lien invalid.'6
The court invalidated the lien because none of Super Structures'
work was incorporated into the site." In short, preparatory work,
no matter how substantial, is not subject to a mechanics' lien in
Virginia.18
For every seemingly harsh result, there seems to be one excep-
tion to the rule that rears its head. In Meeks Disposal Corp. v.
Circle South, L.L.C., the court considered an interesting question:
What happens if a contractor files a mechanics' lien in a timely
manner and otherwise fully complies with the mechanics' lien
statutes, but the clerk of court fails to record that lien on the day
11. See, e.g., Dallan Constr., Inc. v. Super Structures Gen. Contractors, Inc., No.
CL08000473-00, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 74 (Cir. Ct. Jan. 30, 2009) (Hanover County). Of
course, some other interesting cases highlight an exception or two to this strict construc-
tion.
12. Id. at *1.
13. Id. at *1-2.
14. Id. at *2.
15. Id. at *1-2.
16. Id. at *1.
17. Id. at *5.
18. Id. This circuit court decision, while seemingly harsh, is fundamentally correct. A
mechanics' lien is a remedy for recovery of the value of any improvements to real estate
performed by the contractor. See VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010). In this case,
none of the work was incorporated into the real estate, leaving Super Structures with a
run of the mill contract claim. Super Structures, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 74, at *5. Consider,
however, how this is different from the Summit Community Bank v. Blue Ridge Shadows
Hotel & Conference Center, 428 B.R. 231 (W.D. Va. 2010) case discussed below. See infra
notes 34-40 and accompanying text. Which seems more substantial, the work in this case
or in Summit Community Bank?
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of filing?9 The answer? The mechanics' lien is perfected as to the
owner that got proper notice, but not to the "rest of the entire
world."20
In a rare case of substance over form, the Norfolk City Circuit
Court determined that the mere fact that the Clerk of Court did
not perform its clerical duty to record the lien as requested was
not enough to invalidate the memorandum where the contractor
had performed all of the necessary steps to perfect that lien. 21
However, because the lien was never recorded, the court could not
expand notice of the lien to all potential purchasers of the real es-
tate and limited the lien's effectiveness to those that received ac-
tual notice of the lien.22
Another case in which a Virginia circuit court excused an ap-
parent inaccuracy in a memorandum of lien is the case of BP
Realty, L.P. v. Urban Engineering & Associates, Inc.2 3 In this case,
the defendant engineering firm performed surveying work, did
not get paid, and then filed a lien in which it failed to accurately
include "surveying" as part of its scope of work for which it filed
its lien.24 Understandably, the owner of the property pointed out
this inaccuracy and sought to have the lien invalidated.25 The
Fairfax County Circuit Court refused to invalidate the lien for
what it deemed to be an excusable inaccuracy.26
In Comstock Potomac Yard, L.C. v. Balfour Beatty Construc-
tion, L.L.C., the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia considered the question of what constitutes con-
sideration sufficient to support an enforceable mechanics' lien
waiver.27 In Comstock, the dispute centered on the construction of
a commercial condominium complex where the contractor had
19. 79 Va. Cir. 469, 469 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Norfolk City).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. In this case, the opinion does not indicate that a bona fide purchaser was wait-
ing in the wings, so no issues arose on this front. See id.
23. 79 Va. Cir. 176 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Fairfax County).
24. Id. at 176-77. The defendant did include other terms that gave some clue as to
what work it had performed. Id. at 176.
25. Id. at 176.
26. Id. at 179. This last decision by the court begs the question of whether survey
work constitutes an "improvement" such that a mechanics' lien would be initially appro-
priate regardless of any inaccuracy in description. See supra notes 11-18 and accompany-
ing text.
27. No. 1:08-cv-894, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61753, at *36-39 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2009).
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doubts about the owner's ability to continue to finance the
project.28 In an attempt to get the matter resolved, the parties en-
tered into a settlement agreement for full payment of outstanding
invoices, some of the disputed claims, and retainage."9 In ex-
change, the contractor agreed not to file any further mechanics'
liens and to pay off those liens already filed by subcontractors.3 0
Later, after the owner refinanced, the contractor was concerned
that it would not be paid for subsequent work and thus, filed
liens.3' Not surprisingly, the owner defended based upon the set-
tlement agreement and lien waivers.32 The court agreed with the
owner and rejected the argument that the lien waivers were un-
supported by consideration, finding that the owner had made
payments and followed the letter of the agreement and, therefore,
had provided adequate consideration.
In another recent case, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia looked at the question of what types
of materials supplied to a construction project are subject to lien.34
In Summit Community Bank v. Blue Ridge Shadows Hotel &
Conference Center, the court considered the mechanics' lien claim
of a furniture supplier which supplied tables, chairs, and the like
to a large hotel construction project.3 ' The United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia held that these
deliveries constituted improvements under the Virginia lien sta-
tute and therefore allowed the secured claim.3 6 The district court
disagreed and found that such easily movable objects did not con-
28. Id. at *20-21, *31.
29. Id. at *21-23. Retainage is an amount held back from each payment application to
assure full completion of a project by the contractor. Id. at *30--31 n.6.
30. Id. at *27-28.
31. Id. at *31.
32. Id. at *32.
33. Id. at *51. This conclusion was further based upon the fact that the contractor had
sought conditions on the maintenance of reserves and on subsequent refinances but had
eventually agreed to unconditional language. Id. at *39-41. Yet again, the plain language
of a contract prevails, and parties can essentially make their own rules in a contract so
long as it does not violate some higher statutory or constitutional policy.
34. Summit Cmty. Bank v. Blue Ridge Shadows Hotel & Conference Ctr., 428 B.R.
231, 232 (W.D. Va. 2010).
35. Id. at 232.
36. Summit Cmty. Bank v. Blue Ridge Shadows Hotel & Conference Ctr., L.L.C. (In re
Blue Ridge Shadows Hotel & Conference Ctr., L.L.C.), 419 B.R. 308, 313 (W.D. Va. 2009),
rev'd, 428 B.R. 231 (W.D. Va. 2010).
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stitute permanent enough additions to the buildings or realty to
constitute improvements under the lien laws.3
The court reasoned that in order to constitute an "improve-
ment" under the lien statutes, materials need not necessarily be
permanently affixed to the property. 8 However, the materials
must constitute an improvement based on more than their "mere
presence" in the finished building.39 The court then reversed the
bankruptcy court and denied the mechanics' lien claim.40
Smith Mountain Building Supply, L.L.C. v. Windstar Proper-
ties, L.L.C. reminds us that, despite some of the seeming flexibili-
ty found in some of the previously discussed cases, the mechanics'
lien statutes will be strictly construed.41 In Windstar Properties,
the claimant recorded a lien that included sums due for work out-
side of the 150-day window imposed by the mechanics' lien sta-
tute." The claimant then argued that the inclusion of these sums
constituted an "inaccuracy" under Virginia Code section 43-15.43
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, stating that the rule
only allowing inclusion of amounts due for work performed inside
of the 150-day window was a prerequisite to perfection of the lien
and therefore could not constitute an inaccuracy."
B. Miller and "Little" Miller Act Bond Claims
A recent decision under the Federal Miller Act limited the abil-
ity of a general contractor and its surety to use the defense of se-
toff.45 In United States ex rel. Acoustical Concepts, Inc. v. Travel-
ers Casualty & Surety Co. of America, a carpentry subcontractor
completed work on two separate federal subcontracts for the same
37. Summit Cmty. Bank, 428 B.R. at 233-34.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 233.
40. Id. at 234. The court did not, however, give much guidance on what level of per-
manence is necessary to be an improvement. See id. at 232-34. We now know only that
furniture is not permanent enough. Id. at 234.
41. 277 Va. 387, 672 S.E.2d 845 (2009).
42. Id. at 389, 672 S.E.2d at 845 (discussing VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Cum. Supp.
2010)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 391-92, 672 S.E.2d at 847. Consider how this inaccuracy is different from
that found in BP Realty, L.P. v. Urban Engineering & Associates, Inc. 79 Va. Cir. 176 (Cir.
Ct. 2009) (Fairfax County). See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
45. U.S. ex rel. Acoustical Concepts, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 635 F.
Supp. 2d 434, 435 (E.D. Va. 2009).
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general contractor. 46 When it was not paid, the subcontractor sued
the general contractor and its sureties for payment under the Mil-
ler Act.47 The subcontractor sought summary judgment on the ba-
sis that the defendants were not entitled to rely on setoff provi-
sions in the contract.48
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment, refused to enforce the broad setoff provi-
sions found in the federal subcontracts governing the projects.49
The court reasoned that the provisions found in the contracts
sought to frustrate the intent of the Federal Miller Act and that
they were therefore unenforceable.50
In another Federal Miller Act case, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered the interac-
tion between a so called "pay-when-paid" clause and the Miller
Act.5' In United States ex rel. Aarow Equipment & Services v.
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America, the general contrac-
tor did not get paid certain disputed amounts by the owner and
exercised its right not to pay the plaintiff pursuant to its pay-
when-paid clause.52 Aarow then refused to continue work, and the
general contractor subsequently terminated the contract with Aa-
row.53 Aarow sued for payment under the payment bond pursuant
to the Miller Act.1
Travelers defended with a creative argument that combined
the pay-when-paid clause and the termination clause of the con-
tract.5 5 Travelers argued that the pay-when-paid provision
46. Id. at 435.
47. Id. at 436 (discussing the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131-3134 (2006)).
48. Id. at 437.
49. Id. at 442.
50. Id. at 438. This illustrates a rare case of a court within the geographical bounda-
ries of Virginia failing to enforce the letter of a written contract. It does, however, show
that the federal courts will enforce statutory mandates strictly.
51. U.S. ex rel. Aarow Equip. & Servs. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 1:09-
cv-00861, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24042, at *10 (E.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2010). A pay-when-paid
clause is an agreement under which a subcontractor does not get paid unless and until the
general contractor gets paid. See id. at *19-20.
52. See id. at *5-6.
53. Id. at *6.
54. Id. at *6, *13.
55. See id. at *8-10. The termination and pay-when-paid clauses are laid out in the
opinion and will not be reiterated here.
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created a situation in which the termination of Aarow by the gen-
eral contractor was a termination for default and that Aarow was
not entitled to payment." The court then went on to assure the
parties and the lawyers that, absent the termination clause, the
pay-when-paid clause itself would not trump the policy of the Mil-
ler Act, and absent Aarow's default, the pay-when-paid clause
would not have acted as a defense to payment.5 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit told
another cautionary tale to subcontractors that negotiate their
own side deals for payment in United States ex rel. Damuth Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Western Surety Co.51 There, the court examined a
side deal between a mechanical subcontractor and its supplier re-
garding payment for equipment supplied to a Chesapeake, Vir-
ginia project.19 In this case, the plaintiff entered into an agree-
ment with the mechanical subcontractor for full payment on other
work unrelated to the present project and for payments over time
on the Chesapeake project.6 0 The mechanical subcontractor also
demanded, and the plaintiff agreed, that the plaintiff not inform
the general contractor of the deal.6' The mechanical subcontractor
reneged on the deal, and the plaintiff sued under the Federal Mil-
ler Act. 62
The court refused to allow the claim to go forward.63 It reasoned
that, by participating in the agreement not to inform the surety
or the general contractor of the deal, the plaintiff actively misled
the general contractor and the surety.64 This decision by the
plaintiff to forego informing the general contractor of the pay-
ment issues precluded the general contractor from resolving the
situation short of a claim against its bond. 65 Additionally, given
the requirement under Virginia law that money paid to the me-
56. See id. at *19.
57. See id. at *22-23. This case reiterates the policy outlined in the Acoustical Con-
cepts case, favoring payment over contract in Miller Act cases. U.S. ex rel. Acoustical Con-
cepts, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 635 F. Supp. 2d 434 (E.D. Va. 2009). See
supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
58. No. 09-1170, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4607 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 2010).
59. Id. at *2-3, *5-6.
60. Id. at *4.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *1-2, *5-6.
63. Id. at *6.
64. Id. at *10, *17.
65. Id. at *17.
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chanical subcontractor on the Chesapeake project be paid to its
suppliers,66 the court stated that the plaintiff essentially con-
spired to assist the mechanical subcontractor in violating the
law. 67 Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to
grant summary judgment.66
C. Granby Towers
One infamous construction project that produced a lot of litiga-
tion in the past year was the construction of the Granby Towers
in Norfolk, Virginia.66 The project had all of the elements of litiga-
tion waiting to happen, and the parties did not disappoint. The
owner of the project hired Turner Construction Company ("Turn-
er") as the general contractor. 0 The owner then was unable to ob-
tain financing and did not pay Turner for certain work,71 and in
turn, Turner did not pay certain subcontractors.72
In the first set of consolidated cases, the Norfolk City Circuit
Court considered several liens filed against the project by unpaid
subcontractors.7 3 In W. 0. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc. u. 515 Gran-
by, L.L.C. (W.O. Grubb 1), the court considered the interaction be-
tween the mechanics' lien statutes and a financing clause found
in the prime contract between the owner and Turner.7 4
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 43-13 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
67. U.S. ex rel. Damuth Serus., Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4607, at *15, *17.
68. Id. at *19. The lesson for contractors and lawyers from this unpublished opinion is
that side deals must be made carefully and in a way that does not violate the law in order
for even a strict liability claim, such as one under the Miller Act, to be upheld by the
courts.
69. See, e.g., W.O. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc. v. 515 Granby, L.L.C. (WO. Grubb 11),
79 Va. Cir. 400 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Norfolk City); W.O. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc. v. 515 Gran-
by, L.L.C. (W.O. Grubb 1), 78 Va. Cir. 463 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Norfolk City).
70. WO. Grubb II, 79 Va. Cir. at 401.
71. WO. Grubb 1, 78 Va. Cir. at 465.
72. W.O. Grubb II, 79 Va. Cir. at 401.
73. See WO. Grubb I, 78 Va. Cir. at 468.
74. Id. at 464-65 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-7, -11 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp.
2010)). The operative clause at issue reads as follows:
This Agreement and any liability and obligations of the Owner (other than
liability and obligations of Owner for Preconstruction Services) shall be sub-
ject to and expressly conditioned upon the closing by the Owner, and the ini-
tial funding by its lender, of the construction loan (on terms satisfactory to
Owner) and Owner shall have no obligation or liability to Construction Man-
ager for any costs for the Construction Phase under this Agreement unless
such construction loan closing is completed.
Id. at 464.
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In response to the large numbers of liens filed on the project,
the owner filed a plea in bar based upon the fact that it failed to
obtain the financing made a prerequisite to payment.76 Because
the owner had no obligation to make payment to Turner, it ar-
gued that it was not indebted to Turner in any amount, and
therefore, none of the liens could be sustained.76
In response, the subcontractors argued that the owner could
subsequently become indebted to Turner, and therefore, Virginia
Code section 43-7 required that their liens remain in force.77 Addi-
tionally, the subcontractors argued the statute was meant to keep
the owner from paying twice, whereas here, the owner was trying
to keep from paying once.78
The court in W. 0. Grubb I rejected both of these arguments.79 It
rejected the first because it held that the evidence showed that no
financing or construction would occur.o It rejected the second be-
cause the strict language of the statute required that a fully pay-
ing owner, or in this case, an owner that was never obligated to
pay in the first place, will not have to pay at all.81
Some more interesting arguments were made by Turner,
though these too were rejected by the court. 82 Turner made a
three-pronged attempt to overcome the fact that the contract spe-
cifically precluded payment under the circumstances of the case. 3
The first of these arguments was that the contract as a whole re-
quired payment even if a specific clause did not. 84 The second was
that the owner impliedly waived its right to refuse payment when
it issued "the notice to proceed, its directions to continue the
work, and its approval of payment" to Turner.85 The third was
75. See id. at 464-65.
76. See id. The owner relied upon Virginia Code section 43-7 and the specific provision
that "[ilt shall be an affirmative defense ... to a suit to perfect a lien of a subcontractor
that the owner is not indebted to the general contractor ..... Id. at 465 (quoting VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-7 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2010)).
77. Id. at 465.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 465-66.
80. Id. at 465.
81. Id. at 465-66.
82. Id. at 466-68.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 466.
85. Id. at 466-67.
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that the owner was estopped from failing to pay by its actions. 6
The court rejected all three of these arguments and upheld the
plea in bar.8 1
In a second opinion in this set of consolidated cases under the
same caption, W 0. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc. v. 515 Granby,
L.L.C. (WO. Grubb II), the Norfolk City Circuit Court considered
the claims of yet another subcontractor on the Granby Towers
project.8 In this opinion, the court considered the "pay-if-paid"
clause found in Turner's contract with its subcontractor.8 1
Despite the unambiguous nature of the contract's pay-if-paid
clause, the subcontractor argued that the terms of the contract
between the owner and Turner rendered the provision ambi-
guous.90 The subcontractor used two provisions to argue that
Turner must pay its subcontractors before it receives payment
because Turner could only bill the owner for payments made.m
The court refused to read such an ambiguity into the contract be-
cause, the court stated, these two provisions concern the amounts
paid to the contractor and not the timing of those payments. 92
In yet a third decision that fell in favor of Turner and the own-
er, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reached the same conclusion as the Norfolk City Circuit Court."
86. Id. at 467-68.
87. Id. at 468. The court lamented the fact that Turner and its subcontractors would
be financially harmed by the decision but stated that its hands were tied by "the statutes
and contract as written." Id.
88. 79 Va. Cir. 400 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Norfolk City).
89. Id. at 401. The operative language of the contract required that the subcontractor
provide a pay application on or before the last day of the month and further provided that
"[t]he obligation of Turner to make a payment under this Agreement, whether a progress
or final payment, or for extras or change orders or delays to the Work, is subject to the ex-
press condition precedent of payment therefor by the Owner." Id. at 401-02.
90. Id. at 402.
91. Id. The two provisions argued by the subcontractor stated:
§ 6.1.1 The term "Cost of the Work" shall mean costs incurred by the Con-
struction Manager [Turner] in the proper performance of the Work. . . . The
Cost of the Work shall include only the items set forth in this Article 6.
§ 6.1.3 Subcontract Costs: Payments made by the Construction Manager to
Subcontractors in accordance with the requirements of the subcontracts.
Id.
92. Id. The court then went on to state that the contract's "priority" clause resolves
any ambiguities in favor of the subcontract documents. Id. at 404. Once again, strict con-
struction of contract overcomes the alleged unfairness of any result leading to non-
payment. Also, Turner had not paid much, if any, of the money at issue. Id. at 401.
93. Universal Concrete Prods. Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 595 F.3d 527, 532 (4th Cir.
2010] 237
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In Universal Concrete Products Corp. v. Turner Construction Co.,
the court considered the same set of arguments made in the W.O.
Grubb II case.9 4 Not surprisingly, the court upheld the unambi-
guous pay-if-paid clause and cited W. 0. Grubb II in its opinion.5
These cases relating to this disastrous project starkly illustrate
that the contract is king in construction regardless of the poten-
tial lack of equity that may result.
D. Arbitration and Waiver
A recent case acts as a reminder that arbitration rights created
by contract can be waived through failure of enforcement. In
Forrester v. Penn Lyon Homes, Inc., homeowners sued a modular
home manufacturer for breach of the written warranties.96 The
warranties contained a mandatory arbitration clause requiring
that all disputes arising under the warranty be decided by arbi-
tration." The parties then proceeded through eighteen months of
discovery, motions, and settlement discussions until, after much
preparation in anticipation of trial, Penn Lyon Homes moved to
compel arbitration.9
The court refused to compel arbitration at such a late date and
found that Penn Lyon was 'in default in proceeding with such
arbitration' under the Federal Arbitration Act. 99 The court stated
that Penn Lyon was clearly on notice of the express warranty
claim, and despite this notice, Penn Lyon moved toward trial for
almost two years before making its demand.00 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of Penn Lyon's
motion and remanded the case back to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings. 0
2010).
94. See id. at 528 (reviewing applicability and enforceability of pay-when-paid clause).
95. Id. at 531-32. As of the date of the W.O. Grubb I decision, a hole remains where
this project was to be built and acts as a reminder that construction is a risky business
and that economic times can create serious issues for contractors and subcontractors alike.
W.O. Grubb 1, 78 Va. Cir. 463, 465 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Norfolk City).
96. 553 F.3d 340, 341 (4th Cir. 2009).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 341-42.
99. Id. at 342-43 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006)).
100. Id. at 343.
101. Id. at 344. This result is a just one. Parties should not be allowed to drive up costs
and proceed down the road to litigation only to sandbag the opponent at the last minute.
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In another important interpretation of an arbitration clause in
a contract, the Fairfax County Circuit Court looked at language
stating that any claim "relating to" the contract must be resolved
through arbitration.102 In Comer v. Goudie, the plaintiff home-
owners sued the Goudies, principals of the company that was the
actual party to the contract at issue, under various theories of
personal liability after the construction company that was to
build their home did so poorly and went out of business.0 3
In response to these various claims, the Goudies pointed to the
contract and argued that, despite the fact that they were not ac-
tually parties to the contract, the claims made by the homeown-
ers related to the contract and therefore must be arbitrated as
opposed to litigated before the court.104 The circuit court agreed,
stating that the claims of the homeowners fell within the plain
language of the contract and clearly related to the contract and
the work to be performed.10
E. Other Interesting Cases
Aside from the cases in the above mentioned categories, the
Virginia courts produced a few other interesting cases in the con-
struction field.
One such case is Commonwealth v. AMEC Civil, L.L.C. 06
AMEC sued the Virginia Department of Transportation ("VDOT")
seeking more than $21 million in damages.107 The Mecklenburg
County Circuit Court granted AMEC almost all of its damages
and found that AMEC's written notice of intent to make a claim
was proper under the Virginia Code.0
Another state court case reiterates this principal. In Shoosmith Bros., Inc. u. Hopewell
Nursing Home, L.L.C., Kenbridge Construction went too far down the road to trial before
attempting to invoke its arbitration clause. 78 Va. Cir. 427, 429-30 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Hope-
well City). The Hopewell City Circuit Court reached the same conclusion as the Fourth
Circuit in Forrester. See id. at 431.
102. Comer v. Goudie, 78 Va. Cir. 70, 71-72 (Cir. Ct. 1990) (Fairfax County).
103. Id. at 71.
104. Id. at 71-72.
105. Id. at 73. This case demonstrates the need to clearly outline what must and must
not be arbitrated. It also illustrates the Virginia courts' penchant for strict construction of
contractual language, even in the face of seeming injustice.
106. 54 Va. App. 240, 677 S.E.2d 633 (Ct. App. 2009).
107. Id. at 246, 677 S.E.2d at 636.
108. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-386(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010)). The purported notic-
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VDOT appealed, claiming that the notice was not in fact prop-
er.'09 The Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed with VDOT and
overturned the trial court's findings that the notice was both
timely and sufficient."0 In so holding, the court stated that, of the
more than 500 letters relating to the project and stating various
concerns, AMEC only mentioned a potential claim in a few of
them, and as such, AMEC did not properly notify VDOT of its in-
tent to file a claim.",
In Viking Enterprise, Inc. v. County of Chesterfield, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered the interplay between the
Public Procurement Act's six-month statute of limitations and the
Virginia Code requirements regarding appealing a county board
decision."2 In this case, the plaintiff filed its suit within the prop-
er six-month statute of limitations under the Procurement Act,
but failed to file an appeal of the county's denial of its claim with-
in the thirty-day window required for an appeal of a county board
decision."
The circuit court dismissed Viking's case, stating that it had
failed to meet the requirements of the thirty-day notice statute
and therefore was not entitled to continue." On appeal, Viking
argued that the Procurement Act's filing requirements, being
more specific to the particular issues, required that the court al-
low its claim to go forward."5 The court rejected this argument
and reconciled the two statutes in favor of the county, upholding
the circuit court."6
es of intent to file a claim were only a few of the over 500 pieces of correspondence relating
to the project. Id. at 255 n.8, 677 S.E.2d at 641 n.8.
109. Id. at 251, 677 S.E.2d at 639.
110. Id. at 262-63, 280, 677 S.E.2d at 644, 653.
111. Id. at 255 n.8, 677 S.E.2d. at 641 n.8. The court did not, however, make clear what
percentage of the correspondence that mentioned the intent to file a claim on such a large
project would suffice. See id. at 251, 677 S.E.2d at 639.
112. 277 Va. 104, 107, 670 S.E.2d 741, 742 (2009) (discussing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-
4300 to -4377 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2010); id. § 15.2-1246 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
113. Id. at 107-09, 670 S.E.2d at 742-43 (discussing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4363(E)
(Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2010); id. § 15.2-1246 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
114. Id. at 108, 670 S.E.2d at 743.
115. 277 Va. at 110, 670 S.E.2d at 743-44.
116. Id. at 113, 670 S.E.2d at 746. This is yet another case of strict statutory construc-
tion. The court determined Virginia Code section 15.2-1246 provides the exclusive method
of suing a county; therefore, both this statute and the Procurement Act must be complied
with in order to sue a county. Id.
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In Mears Group, Inc. v. L.A. Pipeline Construction Co., the
court considered a disaster of a construction project." L.A. Pipe-
line contracted with Mears Group for Mears Group to drill a tun-
nel for the laying of natural gas pipeline."" In the process, the
tunnel had to be drilled under a creek that subsequently col-
lapsed."9 The litigation surrounded a contractual provision re-
garding abandonment of the work.120 The contract at issue con-
tained a provision that allocated the burden of payment for
abandonment based upon whether the stream bed collapse was a
"subsurface" or "ground" condition.' 12
If the condition leading to abandonment was a "subsurface
condition," Mears Group was entitled to abandon the project and
be paid in full for the work performed up to the point of aban-
donment. 122 However, in the case where the site condition per-
tained to above ground conditions, Mears Group would not be en-
titled to payment. 2 3 The court agreed with Mears Group that a
collapse of a creek bed was a subsurface condition and granted
summary judgment for Mears Group.124
III. SUSTAINABLE "GREEN" BUILDING
The country is moving toward a more sustainable building
stock. Federal, state, and local governments are beginning to in-
stitute energy efficiency and "green" certification measures into
their building codes.125 Private building owners see the benefit in
117. No. 3:08-CV-329, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 750, at *7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 2009).
118. Id. at *3-5.
119. Id. at *9-10.
120. Id. at *15-16.
121. Id. at *15-17.
122. Id. at *16, *30--31.
123. Id. at *21.
124. Id. at *21-26, *35. Once again, the court looked at what it believed to be the plain
meaning of the contract and concluded that a below ground collapse was a "subsurface"
condition. Id. at *23-24.
125. For instance, the city of Richmond will require all new city buildings to meet a
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design ("LEED") Silver standard. Res. No.
2008-R152-2009-14, Council of the City of Richmond (Pub. Hearing 2008) (adopted Jan.
12, 2009). Additionally, California has recently instituted the country's first green building
code. Draft 2010 California Green Building Standards Code (to be codified at CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 24), available at http://www.bsc.ca.gov/default.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010);
Roger Showley, Local Builders Making Homes Earth-Friendly, SIGN ON SAN DIEGO (Apr.
18, 2010, 12:04 AM), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/apr/18/local-builders-mak
ing-homes-earth-friendly/.
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energy efficiency and are looking to have Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design ("LEED") certification on their
projects.16 The ConsensusDOCS have issued a green building ad-
dendum.127 While all of this movement is laudable, the movement
toward sustainability is not without risks.
Few of these risks have been tested because the construction of
these buildings is ongoing, and those buildings that are complete
are so new that any litigation relating to them has yet to mature
to the point that courts have issued any guidance. However,
many of the risks can be anticipated.
For instance, the U.S. Green Building Council ("USGBC") al-
lows any third party to challenge the certification of a project.12 8
An example can be found in a recent challenge to the certification
of the Northland Pines High School in Wisconsin.129 In that chal-
lenge, the challengers argued that the prerequisites for certifica-
tion were not met.o30 The USGBC denied the challenge, and the
certification stood.'3' Clearly, this presents a contract drafting is-
sue when such a challenge can occur from anywhere at any time.
126. LEED v3 is the U.S. Green Building Council ("USGBC") system for rating the sus-
tainability of a construction project or building. It is one of several rating systems, and the
most popular. USGBC, LEED Rating Systems, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?
CMSPagelD=222 (last visited Oct. 30, 2010); USGBC, LEED Version 3 Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentlD=5733 (last visited Oct. 30,
2010).
127. ConsensusDOCS 54310, Green Building Addendum, http://www.consensusdocs.
org/catalog/300-series/consensusdocs-310-green-building-addendum/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2010). The ConsensusDOCS are a second set of widely used form documents and an alter-
native to the AIA series of documents. See id.
128. Green Building Certification Inst., GBCILEED Certification Policy Manual, (Apr.
2009), http://www.gbci.org/Libraries/CertificationResources/LEEDND_CertificationPol
icyManual.sflb.ashx. The wording of the challenge policy in the USGBC LEED Certifica-
tion Handbook does not require that a party have standing or an interest in the project of
any kind. See id. It also allows every certification point to be challenged. See id.
129. Appeal of LEED Certification for Northland Pines High School (Dec. 23, 2008),
http://www.greenbuildinglawblog.com/uploads/file/2%20Complete%20NPHS%2Appeal.
pdf.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Chris Cheatham, Green Building Law Update (May 7, 2010, 06:51 AM), http://
www.greenbuildinglawupdate.com/2010/05/articles/legal-developments/first-ever-leed-chal
lenge-denied/. However, a close inspection of the LEED certification requirements shows
that without the proper prerequisites, the number of points gained on a project is irrele-
vant, and no certification can occur. Green Building Certification Inst., supra note 128.
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Additionally, other third party action issues arise. The simplest
of these relates to energy efficiency measures."' Human beings
will occupy these buildings and will likely leave lights on, leave
doors open, and perform other energy inefficient actions over the
life of a building. Who is responsible for a bad energy rating one,
two, or even five years down the road?
Furthermore, with such risks inherent in LEED and other
green building measures, insurance companies have yet to catch
up with the risk.' 33 This leaves many contractors and design pro-
fessionals without insurance coverage for certain risks.
Green construction even implicates standard of care and
trademark or intellectual property issues.134 If a contractor adver-
tises that it will build to a green standard and does not meet it,
has it met its standard of care? If an attorney is a LEED Accre-
dited Professional, 3 5 does he or she have a higher standard of
care toward his or her clients? Can a contracting company trade
or service mark a certain green building term? All of these issues
have yet to be vetted by the courts but must be dealt with by con-
tract or statute.
Finally, the use of new materials, and old materials in new
ways, creates potential product liability hazards that need to be
considered, both by the insurance companies and those lawyers
that advise the construction industry.136
132. LEED v3 requires energy reporting-though it does not require a building to meet
any particular energy efficiency standard-or a building risks decertification. Press Re-
lease, USGBC, Buildings Seeking LEED to Provide Performance Data (June 25, 2009),
http://www.usgbc.org/DOCS/news/MPRs%200609.pdf.
133. Matthew Brodsky, Making Claims on Green Buildings, RISK & INSURANCE (May 1,
2010), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyl=395650780.
134. Darren A. Prum, Greenbuilding Liability: Considering the Applicable Standard of
Care & Strategies for Establishing a Different Level by Agreement (Social Science Research
Network, Working Paper, Mar. 10, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1619935; J.R. Steele, Green Construction: Initiatives and Legal Issues
Surrounding the Trend, BUSINESS LAW TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2007, http://www.abanet.org/bus
law/blt/2007-11-12/steele.shtml.
135. A LEED Accredited Professional ("LEED AP") refers to the designation of those
certified by the USGBC to supervise a LEED project. GBCI, Glossary, http://www.gbci.
org/glossary.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). See also GBCI, LEED Professional Creden-
tials, http://www.gbci.org/main-nav/professional-credentials/credentials.aspx (last visited
Oct. 30, 2010).
136. Jeffrey D. Masters & John R. Musitano Jr., Managing Liability Risks in Green
Construction, Los ANGELES LAW., Dec. 2007, at 17, 17, available at http://www.lacba.org/
Files/LAL/Vol30No9/2437.pdf.
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In short, with this new frontier comes new risks that must be
considered. Green building is here to stay, so lawyers must learn
to speak "green" and to account for the unique risks that this new
construction world brings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The past two years have brought much change to the construc-
tion law world, by statute, case law, and social change. The Gen-
eral Assembly updated the design professional liability statute3
and made a significant change to the mechanics' lien statute. 3
The courts were not to be left out, issuing significant construc-
tion law opinions in the areas of mechanics' liens,3 payment
bonds,140 statutory interpretations,"' and contractual interpreta-
tion.12 These decisions, some surprising, others not as much, con-
tinue to shape the world of construction law and should be read in
their entirety.
Finally, the social landscape shifted toward sustainable build-
ing. Attorneys and their construction clients will need to stay up
on these cultural changes and the governmental mandates that
they will bring.
137. Act of Mar. 9, 2010, ch. 99, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-411 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
138. Act of Apr. 10, 2010, ch. 341, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 43-1, -4.01 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
139. See, e.g., Smith Mountain Bldg. Supply, L.L.C. v. Windstar Props. L.L.C., 277 Va.
387, 672 S.E.2d 845 (2009).
140. See, e.g., Viking Enter., Inc. v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, 277 Va. 104, 670 S.E.2d 741
(2009).
141. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel Acoustical Concepts, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.,
635 F. Supp. 2d 434, 435 (E.D. Va. 2009) (discussing the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131-
3134 (2006)).
142. See, e.g., WO. Grubb II, 79 Va. Cir. 400 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Norfolk City).
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